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China has had different reactions to North Korean nuclear provocations. When North 
Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
provoked the first nuclear crisis in 1993–1994, China responded relatively softly and 
preferred to remain a bystander. However, in 2003, when North Korea withdrew from the 
NPT and provoked a nuclear crisis again, China reacted quite differently. The country 
actively intervened to settle the crisis and cooperated with the international community. 
This research examines what factors have affected China’s foreign-policy change toward 
the North Korean nuclear issue.  
This research argues that China’s general foreign-policy change had affected 
China’s attitude change toward the North Korean nuclear issue. Since the Tiananmen 
incident, China had maintained a passive attitude in international affairs, until the mid-
1990s. However, China’s attitude toward international affairs changed in the late 1990s. 
China started to resume its diplomatic relationship with the West and successful 
economic development gave China confidence in its comprehensive national power. 
While trying to limit U.S. influence in the Asian region, China has also tried to increase 
its influence in the region and involvement in international affairs. This precipitated 
change in China’s attitude change in the North Korean nuclear issue. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
China has had different reactions to North Korean nuclear provocations. When 
North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and provoked the first nuclear crisis in 1993–1994. China responded relatively softly and 
preferred to remain a bystander. However, in 2003, when North Korea withdrew from the 
NPT and provoked a nuclear crisis again, China reacted quite differently. The country 
actively intervened to settle the crisis and cooperated with the international community. 
This research will examine what factors affected China’s foreign-policy change during 
the North Korean nuclear issue. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons are a big threat, not only to East Asian regional 
security, but also to the international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and related efforts. 
Since North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 1993, the international community—
especially the U. S.—has made various efforts to prevent the country from having nuclear 
weapons. However, the efforts have failed to achieve their goal. North Korea is now 
believed to possess several nuclear weapons and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, 
who succeeded to power after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il, in 2011, recently 
raised tensions in the region by launching a long-range rocket—although Pyongyang 
insisted that it was for the peaceful purpose of launching a satellite.1 In order to convince 
North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions and reduce related threats, international 
cooperation—especially involving China—is very important. 
North Korea matters to China as part of the latter’s broader international behavior. 
Traditionally, China has considered North Korea a buffer zone for Chinese national 
security. Without North Korea, China has to directly confront a border with South Korea, 
in which territory there are U.S. military bases. Since China is concerned about U.S. 
                                                 
1 Sung-yoon Lee, “Why North Korea’s Rocket Mattered,” New York Times, April 14, 2012: A.19. 
 2 
influence in the Asian region, U.S. forces in the border area are a burden for China. 
Furthermore, a regime collapse or instability in North Korea could lead to a massive 
refugee influx from the country. This would impose unrest on Chinese society. China 
also needs regional stability to maintain its trade and economic development. 
Although North Korea has not always followed China’s requests, China is the 
country with most influence on North Korean decision-making. North Korea has often 
had dissension with China, and some Chinese advocate a strong line against North Korea. 
Especially, the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, seems determined to set a course for 
political independence from Beijing, and since he succeeded to power in 2011, the 
political relationships between China and North Korea have been frequently at odds.2  
However, despite Beijing’s frustration and fears about North Korea’s behavior, 
China’s economic support for North Korea continues. In June 2012, Beijing allowed 
20,000 North Koreans to work in the northeastern province of Jilin, and China has 
undertaken a $10 billion infrastructure project on the North Korean border to improve its 
access to an estimated $6 trillion worth of North Korean mineral reserves recently.3 
Beijing also stretched out its hand to North Korea with a significant portion of fuel and 
food aid.  
Geopolitically, China is a neighboring country of North Korea and saved the 
North Korean regime from UN forces during the Korean War. China also is the host 
country of the Six-Party Talks, which can play a crucial role in solving the North Korean 
nuclear issue. Therefore, understanding Chinese foreign policy toward the North Korean 
nuclear issue is important for cooperation among the international community and for 
coming up with a proper solution to this issue. 
                                                 





C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
One needs a better explanation for the changing Chinese behavior toward North 
Korea, because China can play a crucial role in solving the North Korean nuclear issue. 
Furthermore, with such an explanation, one can better predict China’s future response 
and influence it at the margins when North Korea gives another provocation. Therefore, it 
is necessary to understand China’s foreign-policy change toward North Korea. China 
preferred to remain a bystander in the first North Korean nuclear crisis, but it actively 
intervened in the second crisis and played a crucial role in setting the table for 
negotiations. Senior Chinese officials have increased their “shuttle/visitation diplomacy 
on a quarterly basis” from early 2003 to late 2005.4  
What drives China’s foreign-policy change toward North Korea? Various factors 
might affect this change. For example, China might consider the second North Korean 
nuclear crisis as a good chance to improve its relationship with the U.S., or the growing 
trade volume with South Korea might lead China to increase its shuttle/visitation 
diplomacy. Also, China might be willing to develop a better relationship with North 
Korean midlevel officials who are have gained more influence inside North Korea, so 
China can influence North Korea’s nuclear policy in the future. However, China’s foreign 
policy change was not a result of any single factor. While trying to maintain good 
relationship with other countries, China also sought to increase its influence in the Asian 
region. Additionally, China tried to make a balance between the two Koreas. Therefore, 
in order to understand the Chinese foreign-policy change in the North Korean nuclear 
issue, one should consider the country’s overall foreign-policy change first.  
Historically, China has shown dynamic foreign-policy changes since its 
establishment in 1949. Sometimes the country maintained good relations with the two 
major super powers—the U.S. and the Soviet Union—and sometimes it experienced 
military conflicts with them. Sometimes the country isolated itself from the international 
community and sometimes it actively engaged it. Major foreign-policy changes also 
happened in China between the mid-1990s and the 2000s. China experienced a new 
                                                 
4 Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 67. 
 4 
security environment and position in the international community. Domestically, new 
fourth-generation leaders with confidence in China’s development took power in the 
early 2000s. As a result, the country raised its voice in the international community and 
expanded its engagement in the regional multilateral community. Thus, this research will 
hypothesize that China’s general foreign policy changed between the mid-1990s and the 
2000s and influenced China’s active involvement in the North Korean nuclear crisis in 
the early 2000s.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several scholars have dealt with the factors that have influenced China’s foreign 
policy change toward the North Korean nuclear issue, and they can be separated into 
three major camps, focused on the following factors: a growing security concern, a 
changing perception of other countries, and changes in domestic factors. There is also a 
school of thoughts that China’s foreign policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue has 
not changed. 
In the first camp, some scholars claim that a growing security concern made 
China change its foreign policy. Ok-joon Kim argues that China was worried that the 
North Korean nuclear program caused instability in Northeast Asia, which gave an 
excuse to Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan to develop their military power. Thus, 
China realized that it had to take some measures to stop North Korea’s nuclear testing.5  
Hong-seo Park analyzes China’s policy change from a perspective of alliance. He 
argues that China sought to achieve a balance between entrapment and abandonment. To 
avoid the abandonment of North Korea, China kept objecting to “Washington’s 
willingness to take more assertive measures, economic sanctions and military action.” 
However, when the possibility of “entrapment caused by the conflict between its weak 
ally [North Korea] and strong adversary [the U.S.]” increased in the second North Korean 
                                                 
5 Ok-joon Kim, “The Major Reasons of China’s Active Role in North Korea Nuclear Issue,” The 
Korean Journal of Unification affairs vol.16, no. 1 (2004): 313.  
 5 
nuclear crisis, China pressured North Korea and improved relations with the U.S. to 
prevent unwanted entrapment.6  
Ki-jung Kim and woong-ha Na considers two variables in analyzing the change: 
“Cohesiveness in the Chinese-North Korean alliance, and a Chinese sense of ‘fear of 
entrapment’ which assumingly resulted from the changes of the Third Party (the U.S.).” 
They explain that “a combination of those two variables caused a changing degree of 
‘security sensitivity’ that China might have regarding the North Korean nuclear crisis.”7  
In the second camp, some parts of the literature insist that China’s changing 
perception of other countries was the main cause of the policy change. You-en Kim 
points out that the relationship between China and North Korea influenced the policy 
change. The relation of China and North Korea was often described with the expression 
“as close as lips to teeth.” However, the new generation of Chinese leaders has started to 
see North Korea in a different perspective. The provocation of North Korea’s threat to 
regional security made some in China’s new generation start to view North Korea as a 
burden rather than a buffer zone. Thus, the perspective of this “liability school” rather 
than the “buffer-zone school” in China was reflected in the policy toward the North 
Korean nuclear crisis.8 
Some others in the second camp conclude that the change can be explained by the 
relationship between the U.S. and China. Suk-hee Han contends that both internal (new-
generation leaders) and international factors (the U.S.) made China change its policy. He 
claims that China considered friendly relations with the U.S. as beneficial for its activity 
in the international community, so China got involved in the North Korean nuclear crisis 
                                                 
6 Hong-seo Park, “China’s Management of Alliance Dilemma over the Nuclear Crisis in the Korean 
Peninsula: Its Theory and Practice,” The Korean Journal of International Relations 46, no. 1 (Apr 
2006):122. 
7 Ki-jung Kim and Woong-ha Na, “Observation and Intervention : the Changing Pattern of Chinese 
Foreign Policy toward the First, and the Second Crisis of North Korean Nuclear Problem,” 중소연구  33, no. 
1 (2009): vii. 
8 You-en Kim, “Understanding China’s calculus of Nuclear Issue in North Korea: Focused on the Six-
Party Talk,” 중소연구  28, no. 3 (2004): 185. 
 6 
to reinforce U.S.–Chinese relations.9 David M. Lampton claims that after September 11, 
2001, when Washington became more preoccupied with terrorism than a rising China, 
Beijing saw a “window of opportunity to pursue its goals for domestic development 
without excessive threat from the United States” and tried to improve cooperation with 
Washington (“including an affirmative vote for UN Resolution 1441 in November 2002 
concerning Iraq”).10 
Kwan-ok Kim argues that China adopted “both balancing and bandwagoning 
polices” under the U.S. unipolar system. As a part of bandwagon policies, China 
cooperated with the U.S. in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue.11  
In the third camp, some of the literature examines the change based on Chinese 
domestic factors. Ae-gyeong Kim insists that since the mid-1990s, China’s national 
identity has changed from that of a third-world country to that of a great responsible 
power. When North Korea provoked the first nuclear crisis, China emphasized absolute 
national sovereignty and was biased toward North Korea. However, in the second crisis, 
China highlighted the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security, 
actively mediating between the U.S. and North Korea in the role of a great responsible 
power. These different responses were based on China’s national-identity change.12 
Ok-joon Kim and Suk-hee Han also believe that “reform policy and new 
leadership of the Chinese government” are the main domestic factors of China’s foreign 
policy change toward the North Korean nuclear issue.13 
In sum, the literature that analyzes the factors influencing China’s foreign policy 
change toward the North Korean nuclear crisis can be categorized in three ways: a 
                                                 
9 Suk-hee Han, “Six-Party Talks and China’s Diplomatic Dilemma.” The Korean Journal of 
International Relations 45, no. 1 (Apr 2005):179–183. 
10 David M. Lampton, “The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations,” The National Interest no. 
73 (Oct 2003): 39. 
11 Kwan-ok Kim, “U.S. Unipolarity and Change of Chinese Foreign Policy,” The society of China 
Culture in Korea vol. 27 (2009):234. 
12 Ae-kyung Kim, “The change in China’s Perception of Identity,” National Strategy vol. 10, no. 4 
(Winter 2004):33.  
13 Kim, “Major Reasons of China’s Active Role,” 53; Han, “Six-Party Talks and China’s Diplomatic 
Dilemma,” 179–183. 
 7 
growing security concern, a changing perception of the U.S. and/or North Korea, and 
changing domestic factors, such as new leaders in government or national identity.  
Contrary to these three camps, some scholars argue that China’s foreign policy 
toward the North Korean nuclear issue did not change between the first and second 
nuclear crisis. Heung-kyu Kim contends that, unlike the passive-attitude image, China 
played a constructive role in the first North Korean nuclear crisis.14 While emphasizing a 
peaceful solution to the issue, China asserted the principle of a nuclear-free Korean 
peninsula. Thus, China joined the international pressure on North Korea by not opposing 
the adoption of a Security Council resolution calling for denuclearization of North Korea. 
Heung-kyu Kim also insists that China’s attitude made North Korea recognize that it 
could be completely isolated if it worsened the situation. China led North Korea to make 
the transition to mitigating the provocation in the first crisis. However, evidence 
developed in this thesis tends to discount the “no-change” interpretation. 
Analyses of the security factor fail to explain why China reacted differently 
between the first and second nuclear crises. When the first nuclear crisis broke out in 
1993, there was also strong concern about a regional nuclear domino effect and about a 
U.S. attack against the North Korean nuclear reactor.15 In regards to alliances, the smaller 
power in an alliance usually worries about abandonment and entrapment. The difference 
in national power between China and North Korea made their relationship asymmetrical, 
so the relationship of the two countries can be described as that between a patron and a 
client.16 In that case, why should it matter to China if it is abandoned by North Korea?  
The changing perceptions of other countries were crucial factors in determining 
China’s foreign policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue, but they were just one of 
                                                 
14 Heung-Gyu Kim, “The 1st,2nd North Korean nuclear crisis and China’s policy,” 
http://www.koreapeace.or.kr/modules/forum/forum_view.html?fl_no=377. 
15 Sam Jameson, “Official Says Japan Will Need Nuclear Arms if N. Korea Threatens,” Los Angeles 
Times, Jul 29, 1993; Doyle McManus, “Clinton Warns N. Korea Not to Build A-Bomb,” Los Angeles 
Times, Nov 8, 1993. 
16 Christopher C. Shoemaker and John Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises 
in the Nuclear Age (Praeger Pub, 1984), 13. 
 8 
many factors that can explain the change. Domestic factors were important, but they also 
cannot alone explain a nation’s foreign-policy change.  
In principle, China’s foreign policy in the North Korean nuclear issue has not 
changed. China has maintained the position that a nuclear-free Korean peninsula through 
peaceful means is the only solution to the problem. China also has insisted that the North 
Korean nuclear crisis is a product of the trouble between the U.S. and North Korea, so the 
two have to come up with the solution. Despite this principle, however, there were 
changes in China’s actual response in the North Korean nuclear issue. China publicly 
criticized North Korea’s nuclear program and took a leading role in the Six-Party Talks. 
China’s senior officials increased their shuttle/visitation diplomacy for the successful Six-
Party Talks. Sometimes, China used coercive methods to persuade North Korea. 
Therefore, it needs to be explained how China’s general foreign policy changed, and how 
it affected China’s attitude change toward the North Korean nuclear issue. 
It is necessary to make a general point about broader changes in Chinese foreign 
policy that are produced by different sources and have effects on Chinese policy toward 
North Korean nuclear issues. Ok-joon Kim and Suk-hee Han examined both domestic 
and international factors, but they focused on only limited factors, such as new leaders, 
security concerns, and China’s perception of the U.S. Thus, they fail to explain China’s 
foreign-policy change. 
To overcome these shortcomings, this thesis will improve on the explanation of 
Chinese policies toward North Korea by drawing more on literature explaining Chinese 
foreign policy in general. Therefore, this thesis will survey China’s general foreign-
policy change in the field of “regional stability and economic development,” which is 
relevant to the North Korean nuclear issue. The areas I plan to survey in assessing these 
changes in Chinese foreign policy include the growing Chinese economy and economic 
diplomacy, international activity and participation in international institutions, and 
China’s relationship with North Korea. 
 9 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This paper examines what factors have affected China’s foreign-policy change on 
the basis of China’s national interest and policy toward its ally. The methods employed 
rely on comparative-case studies between the first and second North Korean nuclear 
crisis and qualitative analysis of sources. The North Korean nuclear issue is directly 
related with Asian regional security, and China’s position toward the issue reflects 
China’s attitude toward its neighboring countries and the international community. Thus, 
comparisons include Chinese foreign-policy changes toward North Korea, its security 
environment, and its attitude and general foreign-policy changes vis-a-vis neighboring 
countries and the international community. Primary sources include public speeches, and 
secondary sources include academic papers, journalistic sources, and scholarly books. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This study estimates how China’s reaction changed between the first and second 
North Korean nuclear crises and what caused China to make the changes. Chapter II will 
discuss the North Korean nuclear crises and China, including the North Korean nuclear 
program, the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis, and the change in China’s 
response. Chapter III discusses China’s foreign-policy change. This includes China’s 
national interest, security environment, and general foreign-policy changes. China’s 
position toward North Korea and the nuclear issue are examined as well. Chapter IV 
discusses China’s attitude change toward multilateralism and regional multilateral 
institutions and examines multilateral cooperation and the Six-Party Talks. Chapter V 
contains conclusions that the causes of China’s attitude change toward the North Korean 
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND CHINA 
Despite criticism from the international community, North Korea has desired to 
possess nuclear weapons for a long time. During its nuclear-weapon development, North 
Korea has provoked international tension several times. Especially, the country provoked 
an international crisis in 1994 by withdrawing NPT and in 2002 by admitting the 
existence of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. The first crisis could be solved 
peacefully through negotiation, and North Korea seemed to give up nuclear-weapons 
possession. However, since the second crisis broke out, North Korea and the international 
community have failed to find a consensus, and North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 
2006. China had shown different responses between the first and second North Korean 
nuclear crises. This chapter will examine how the two North Korean nuclear crises 
developed and China’s different responses. 
A. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS 
1. The North Korean Nuclear Program 
Since the establishment of the country, North Korea had long desired to possess 
nuclear weapons. Ironically, U.S. nuclear power prompted North Korea’s desire to 
possess nuclear weapons at the beginning. During the Korean War, faced with endless 
Chinese forces, the U.S. considered using atomic bombs as part of a strategy to drive 
Chinese forces out of the Korean peninsula. After the Korean War, the U.S. stationed 
several tactical nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula to prevent North Korea’s 
invasion of South Korea. “The psychological impact of Korean War-era U.S. nuclear 
threats combined with the physical deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on South Korean 
soil elicited a strong response from Kim Il Sung, and he reportedly began exploring 
prospects for a North Korean nuclear program.”17  
                                                 
17 John S. Park, and Song Sun Lee, “North Korea: Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage,” 
in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008): 272. 
 12 
The North Korean nuclear program started in 1955 when Kim Il-sung ordered the 
establishment of a nuclear institute. The nuclear physics institute was founded in 
Yongbyon and brought a research reactor from the Soviet Union in 1960. The institute 
succeeded in extracting plutonium for the first time in 1975 and put its efforts into 
producing nuclear weapons during the 1980s.18 The North Korean nuclear program has 
grown into a “serious security concern to the surrounding countries as well as the U.S,” 
since a U.S. satellite found construction of new reactor facilities at Yongbyon in 1982.19 
Although North Korea joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, as a result of pressure 
from the Soviet Union, North Korea did not intend to abandon its nuclear ambitions. 
2. The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT and provoked the first North 
Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. Despite the suspicion of North Korean nuclear ambition, 
there were some peaceful movements in the Korean peninsula in the early 1990s. 
However, this peaceful atmosphere did not last long. In 1991, President George H.W. 
Bush announced the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. 
The two Koreas also signed the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsula, which declared they would not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, 
store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. 20  Following that, North Korea concluded a 
comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in January 1992. North Korea declared seven nuclear sites and 90 grams of 
plutonium subject to IAEA inspection, and the IAEA conducted inspections at those sites 
from 1992–1993. However, the IAEA inspectors found problems with the amount of 
plutonium declared in North Korea’s initial report and demanded special inspections. 
North Korea rejected the IAEA’s request to inspect two suspicious sites, and the U.S. 
tried to impose economic sanctions on North Korea through the UN Security Council. 
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Confronted with this brinkmanship strategy, in 1994, North Korea declared that the 
country would withdraw from the NPT and considered the sanction an act of war. 
Furthermore, the country took a very bellicose posture by unloading enough nuclear fuel 
rods to make five nuclear weapons. In response to these provocations, the U.S. 
considered military action against the nuclear facility and the tension reached a peak.21 
The dramatic settlement of the first North Korean nuclear crisis came when 
former U.S. president Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang and met with North Korean leader 
Kim Il-Sung. Since the meeting, the two countries have had several high-level talks and 
signed an agreed-upon framework in 1994. In the framework, North Korea agreed to 
observe the NPT and the safeguards agreement. As a reward of this, the U.S. agreed to 
provide two 1,000MWe-level light-water nuclear reactors by 2003 and 500,000 tons of 
heavy oil annually until the reactor was provided. 
3. The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
The second North Korean nuclear crisis started in 2002. When James Kelly—
assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs—visited Pyongyang in 2002, 
North Korea admitted the existence of the HEU program.22 However, a severe worsening 
in relations between the U.S. and North Korea emerged when new-president George W. 
Bush took power in 2001. Unlike the Clinton administration, the Bush administration 
took a strong attitude toward North Korea. President Bush and his staff judged that the 
Clinton administration’s policy toward North Korea was a failure. Furthermore, the 
president revealed his abhorrence of North Korean leader Kim Jung-il. He described 
North Korea as one part of an “axis of evil” in his first state-of-the-union address and 
refused to negotiate with the country.23 
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While the construction of the two 1,000MWe-level light-water nuclear reactors 
was delayed, and the U.S. increased pressure, North Korea refused to allow IAEA 
inspection and requested bilateral talks with the U.S. However, Washington rejected 
dialogue with North Korea until the country abandoned its nuclear program and 
committed to complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID).  
As North Korea continued rejecting the abandonment of its nuclear ambition, the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) stopped the oil supply to 
North Korea in November 2002. In response to this, North Korea removed the 
surveillance camera from the Yongbyon nuclear site, expelled every IAEA inspector, and 
declared withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. After Pyongyang withdrew from the 
NPT on 10 January 2003, the possibility of U.S. military action against North Korea 
increased. In March 2003, the U.S. dispatched the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to 
South Korea and deployed a dozen B-52 and B-1 bombers to Guam to pressure the North 
Korean regime.24 As the tension grew, there were strong concerns in the region of “the 
Bush doctrine of preemptive strike becoming reality.”25  
B. CHINA’S CHANGE IN RESPONSE DURING THE NORTH KOREAN 
NUCLEAR CRISIS 
1. The First Crisis 
When the first crisis happened, Washington realized that it had to seek China’s 
help in settling the crisis. A senior government official said that “The consensus [within 
the Clinton Administration] is that China is the key to solving the North Korea crisis.”26 
Thus, Washington and Seoul requested that China cooperate in solving this issue. 
However, Beijing kept repeating the principle that China supports the denuclearization of 
the Korean peninsula, but there is also a national-sovereignty issue, and it refused to take 
any role or responsibility in this situation. In June 1993, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 
                                                 
24 B. Demick, “THE WORLD; U.S. flexes muscles before the Koreas; scheduled war games with 
South Korea apparently are meant to impress the North” Los Angeles Times, Mar 21, 2003, A.26. 
25 Chinoy, Meltdown, 164. 
26 Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Agrees to Discuss Arms Directly with North Korea,” New York Times, Apr 23, 
1993. 
 15 
Qichen, while on a visit to Seoul, told South Korean officials that “China has very little 
leverage with Pyongyang, despite the North’s economic dependence on China.”27 He has 
also made it clear on many occasions that Beijing is “not only opposed to economic 
sanctions [on North Korea] but also against bringing up the issue at all in the IAEA and 
the Security Council.”28 Thus, when the IAEA asked the UN Security Council to enforce 
on North Korea the April 1993 provisions of international agreements controlling nuclear 
arms, China opposed the sanction.29 Prime Minister Li Peng told the United Nations 
secretary general in a meeting in December 1993, “China favors a proper settlement of 
the issue through dialogue and consultation, instead of imposing pressure and 
sanctions.” 30  Furthermore, despite many countries’ opposition, China conducted an 
underground nuclear test in October 1993 which could negatively affect the North 
Korean nuclear crisis. The White House issued a written statement that it “deeply 
regretted the test and urged China to refrain from others.”31 China’s nuclear test could 
negatively affect the North Korean nuclear crisis by giving the impression that sovereign 
nations should not surrender to foreign pressure. Pyongyang might consider that if China 
could do nuclear tests despite Western opposition, why shouldn’t North Korea? 
There were several reasons that China maintained this passive and uncooperative 
attitude toward the U.S. in the crisis. First, China believed strongly in national 
sovereignty and thought that the U.S. tried to interfere in socialist countries’ sovereignty. 
Samuel S. Kim argues that after the Tiananmen incident that “twin legitimation crises at 
home (the Tiananmen carnage of June 1989) and abroad (the collapse of transnational 
communism at its epicenter), international sanctions, especially U.S.-sponsored sanctions 
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against a socialist regime, trigger the sound and furious response of state sovereignty.”32 
If the U.S.-led international community succeeded in oppressing a socialist regime, this 
precedent would also be imposed on China later. Chinese representatives decided “If you 
[the U.S.] can’t force the North Koreans to do what you want, how do you imagine you 
could ever force the Chinese to do anything?” 33  Thus, China considered the North 
Korean nuclear issue related to national sovereignty and remained passive in its attitude 
against the U.S.-led international movement.  
Second, Beijing considered that they needed to check U.S. influence in the Asian 
region. Some Chinese emphasized the need to build a new type of relations with other 
countries “as a new strategic move to prevent U.S. hegemonies from subverting China 
and intervening in the internal affairs of other Asian countries.”34 
Chinese leaders considered that the U.S. was the only country that could pose a 
threat to China’s future security and “they saw U.S. policy in Asia and world affairs as 
adverse to Chinese interests.”35 Thus, Beijing opposed U.S. policies in Asia. Robert G. 
Sutter argues that “In response to U.S.-led sanctions and criticisms in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the Chinese government and Chinese Community Party (CCP) endeavored 
to use foreign affairs to demonstrate the legitimacy and prestige of China’s communist 
leaders.”36 Patterns of behavior reflecting this tendency were seen repeatedly in “Chinese 
leaders’ policies and behavior toward the United States and U.S. interests in Asia in the 
post-cold war period.”37 Through commentary and official pronouncements, Beijing also 
expressed its perception that international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) were becoming increasingly important to its interests of economic 
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development and political stature, but remained dominated by the United States and other 
Western powers.”38  
Third, China calculated that although North Korea possessed nuclear weapons, it 
did not represent serious damage to China’s national interest. The North Korean nuclear 
program is a threat to the U.S., not to China. China’s most important concern is economic 
growth and the Taiwan issue. Since the issue is not “China’s core national security 
interest” China did not need to be actively involved in this issue. 39 Thus, China judged 
that supporting North Korean regime stability was better for China’s national interests 
than imposing international sanctions on North Korea.  
These factors were largely influenced by China’s foreign policy in general. While 
China did not much care about the North Korean nuclear threat, Chinese viewed “the 
post–Cold War U.S. global strategy as expansionist in nature due to its superior 
comprehensive power (Zonghe guoli).”40 Since there was little to gain in China’s national 
interest, Chinese worried that cooperation with the U.S.-led international order would 
infringe upon its sovereignty and impose negative effects on China. While there was little 
motivation to improve relations with the U.S. since the Tiananmen incident, the wariness 
toward U.S. hegemony strongly influenced China’s foreign policy and hindered 
cooperate with the U.S. during the first nuclear crisis. 
2. The Second Crisis 
In contrast to the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, China 
changed its attitude to active involvement in the second crisis in 2002. The second North 
Korean nuclear crisis threatened the stability of Northeast Asia, contrary to China’s 
national interest. Thus, China’s initial response toward North Korea was not favorable. If 
China played a crucial role to solve the problem, however, the country could improve its 
image as a responsible superpower in the international community. Although the 
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relationship between the U.S. and China had improved since September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
considered China a strategic contender and potential threat. Against this Chinese-threat 
theory, Beijing tried to impose the image of China as a peaceful and harmonious country. 
Thus, China saw that displaying a peaceful and responsible attitude during the second 
North Korean nuclear crisis was an opportunity to pursue a broader agenda of 
engagement with the U.S. and enhance its reputation for responsible behavior in the eyes 
of other states.  
From the beginning, China made it clear that the country opposed North Korea’s 
nuclear possession. At first, China reemphasized its principle goals of denuclearization of 
the peninsula, maintaining stability and peace, and solving problems with peaceful 
negation. After North Korea withdrew from the NPT, China’s leader, Jiang Zemin, 
telephoned U.S. president George W. Bush and denounced North Korea. He emphasized 
“the importance of safeguarding the international nuclear nonproliferation system and 
promised to work with all parties concerned to promote an early peaceful settlement of 
the DPRK nuclear issue.”41 
China also hoped the U.S. and North Korea could solve the problem through 
bilateral negation. However, when the U.S. rejected bilateral negotiation with North 
Korea strongly, China tried to relieve the crisis through a multilateral framework. China 
convened the Three Party Talks in 2003 as a precursor to the Six-Party Talks and tried to 
persuade North Korea to come up to the talks. In mid-July 2003, deputy minister of 
foreign affairs Dai Binggou carried a letter from president Hu Jintao to North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-il, again urging the North to resume talks with Washington.42 
For successful six-party talks, China designated Ning Fukui as a Chinese special 
envoy for the North Korean ambassador. Beijing also strengthened its governmental 
structure about North Korean nuclear issue by mobilizing “a professional work force of 
about two hundred experts from nine departments or bureaus in the Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs.”43 When the claims of the U.S. and North Korea were in direct opposition, senior 
Chinese officials increased shuttle diplomacy between the two countries to bring them to 
the negotiating table. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi has described its role as 
“active mediation.”44  
In contrast to the first North Korean nuclear crisis, Beijing also put more pressure 
on North Korea to solve the crisis. On 12 February 2003, China voted for an “IAEA 
resolution to refer North Korea’s nuclear noncompliance for discussion at the UN 
Security Council.”45 This was a quite different reaction compared to the previous case in 
the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993, when China gave up its vote in the same 
resolution.  
China also sent various signals to North Korea regarding the nuclear issue.46 
These signals varied from tacit warning, such as declaratory statements and hints through 
public media, to tangible policies, such as China’s North Korean refugee policy, counter-
proliferation exercise participation, and border-region military deployment.  
Since 2002, China’s officials and media used unprecedented phrases of warning 
to North Korea in statements regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. For example, 
prior to the test in 2006, China’s ambassador to the UN warned North Korea that “no 
country is going to protect North Korea” if North Korea continued provocative 
behavior. 47  After the test, Xinhua news criticized North Korea, in that the country 
“ignored universal opposition of the international community and flagrantly conducted 
the nuclear test on Oct. 9” and “the Chinese government is resolutely opposed to it.”48 
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China also sought to pressure North Korea through its diplomatic policies were 
related to North Korea.49 Prior to the test, China had repatriated North Korean refugees to 
the country. After the missile test, however, Beijing allowed a number of North Korean 
refugees to go to the U.S. or South Korea. China used this refugee issue as a way to warn 
North Korea regarding their nuclear testing.  
China’s pressure in North Korea’s nuclear issue has also included military 
exercises. “Since many regard Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as primarily aimed at 
North Korea,” China’s participated in the multilateral counter-proliferation cooperation 
which “mirrored the Bush Administration’s PSI in all but name” was an obvious warning 
signal toward North Korea.50  
China also wielded coercive methods in the economic field. Although it was 
described as a technical problem, China halted the oil flow to North Korea for three days 
in February 2003. This could be interpreted as a “message from China designed to 
remind North Korea of its economic dependence on Beijing.”51 China’s efforts have 
succeeded in establishing six-party talks, which include the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, 
and the two Koreas.  
In sum, China’s response toward the North Korean nuclear issue during the mid-
2000s was different from its previous position that the country would not interfere in 
other countries’ domestic affairs. China used both sticks and carrots to persuade North 
Korea to come to negotiation. Although the six-party talks failed to achieve their goal—
denuclearization of the peninsula—China did succeed in using the crisis to improve its 
position in the international community and show its influence as a regional power. 
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III. CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE 
There have been a lot of changes between the early 1990s and the early 2000s in 
the Northeast Asian security environment. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. 
became the sole superpower in the world. As China no more needed to worry about 
foreign invasion, economic development, national sovereignty and internal stability 
became China’s main interest. China’s rapid economic development also brought 
changes in foreign policy. China’s fourth-generation leaders—represented by Hu 
Jintao—have shown their confidence in China’s national power and presented themselves 
as a responsible superpower in foreign affairs. On the other hand, as the country’s power 
has risen, the perception of China as a threat has gained strength in the international 
community. Thus, China also has emphasized its intention to rise peacefully in the 
international community. With the change of security environment, a new security 
concept has emerged, and has started to pay attention to regional multilateral institutions 
in the mid-1990s. This chapter will survey how China’s foreign policy changed between 
the 1990s and 2000s. 
A. CHINA’S NATIONAL INTEREST 
China’s leaders have considered sovereignty and economic development as their 
most important national interests. The Chinese have considered the period from the 
Opium War in 1842 to the foundation of PRC in 1949 as a hundred years of suffering and 
humiliation. Thus, Chinese nationalism is strongly embedded in sovereignty issues, and is 
furthermore connected with political stability. The core of sovereignty is that political 
authority lies exclusively in the hands of spatially differentiated states.52  
Especially, China shows very sensitive response in Taiwan issue. The Chinese 
have considered reunification with Taiwan a matter of national sovereignty. Because of 
this, Beijing shows a very adamant attitude and sometimes does not hesitate to use 
military action toward the Taiwanese independence movement. Beijing continues to 
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insist that “Taiwan is where China’s core interest lies, . . . and there is no room for 
compromise on that issue. . . . Our nation’s long-term diplomatic goal is clear, i.e., to 
realize a national rejuvenation.”53 However, whenever there was tension in the Taiwan 
Strait, the U.S. has intervened and supported Taiwan. Thus, China considers that the U.S. 
still infringes on the sovereignty of China. In this respect, China seeks to restrict the 
influence of the U.S. in the region.  
Continuous economic development is also important to China’s national interest. 
Unlike Western realists who focus on military security, Chinese leaders believe that 
international politics is the area of competition for attaining comprehensive national 
power (CNP), which refers to the combined overall conditions and strengths of a country 
in numerous areas. During the Cold War and the U.S.–Soviet confrontation, national 
power was largely determined by a country’s military force.54 However, as the world 
moves toward multipolarity, other elements such as economy and technology have 
become increasingly important. Thus, most Chinese analysts believe that, with the end of 
Cold War, economic interests are more important than ideological differences. China’s 
economic development has a strict connection with Communist regime survival. In order 
to accomplish both undistracted economic development and political stability, China 
emphasizes “the need to maintain and promote stability and prosperity in Asia.”55 
In sum, sovereignty and economic growth are China’s most important national 
interests. To achieve these goals, China needs to limit U.S. influence in the Asian region. 
China also tries to increase its influence in the region through cooperation with 
neighboring countries.  
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B. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
1. Before the mid-1990s 
During the mid-1990s, China still considered the international community to be 
hostile to China. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the 
security environment of China had changed substantially. Until the late 1960s, China was 
primarily concerned with “the safety of its territory,” and therefore, the security concept 
was dominated by “ideological competition and the threat of war.”56 Although Chinese 
communists expelled the Koumintang to Taiwan, the country was still in civil war with 
the Republic of China (ROC); to make matters worse, the United States hindered China’s 
military action by supporting the ROC (such as sending the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan 
Strait). Because China was concerned about the threat of the U.S., it was forced to rely on 
its neighboring powerful communist country—the Soviet Union. Beijing’s policy of 
leaning to one side—the Soviet—was codified in 1956 at the first national congress of the 
CCP. Party statesman Liu Shaoqi announced that “Chinese foreign policy priorities 
included strengthening linkages with the USSR and her allies as well as opposing 
imperialist practices while supporting the growing trend in the developing world towards 
de-colonization and independence.”57 By the late 1950s, however, relations with Moscow 
became aggravated, eventually leading to armed conflict between the two countries. 
Therefore, China had to confront two superpowers—the U.S. and the Soviet Union—
simultaneous. To avoid isolation, given their relations with both superpowers, China tried 
to cooperate with third-world countries and focused on war preparation rather than 
economic development.58 
In the 1970s, China normalized its relations with Western countries and 
implemented free-market reforms, therefore greatly improving their security environment. 
The U.S. needed China to check Soviet expansion, so the U.S. and China tried to improve 
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their ties during the 1970s, leading to the normalization of diplomatic relations between 
the two countries in 1979. By the 1980s, reconciliation with the Soviets was also 
accomplished; thus, China could focus on its domestic stability and economic growth 
without any threat of foreign invasion. Since the end of the Cold War, there was no 
serious security threat to China, and the country could enjoy a peaceful international 
environment.  
This period of relative international security was cut short due to the Tiananmen 
incident in 1989, which once again put China back in international isolation. Typically, 
during Jiang Zemin’s regime (1989–2001), the West, headed by the U.S., “had submitted 
anti-China motions to United Commission on Human Rights for eleven times” and “took 
a series of sanctions towards China.”59 Domestically, the Tiananmen incident “almost 
made the Chinese Communist Party lose her authority,” so “domestic security played 
more important role on China’s national security” during the early 1990s.60  
Additionally, China’s growing economic and military power increased 
perceptions of it as a potential threat. Especially in the U.S, the “China-threat theory,” 
that a rising China would inevitably conflict with the U.S., was widespread among 
experts.61 In Washington, “Policymakers, strategic thinkers, academics, and pundits have 
started exploring strategies of containing China, and rejecting the concept of peaceful 
rise.”62  Furthermore, the Taiwan issue is the most sensitive matter in the U.S. and 
Chinese relationship. China considers reunification with Taiwan as a matter of national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, China has shown a very aggressive attitude 
towards the independence movement in Taiwan. Although China prefers a peaceful 
solution in the reunification with Taiwan, the country has never given up the possibility 
of using force to achieve unification. “The Taiwan strait crisis in 1996 was the greatest 
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challenge to Sino-American relations in several decades.”63 In order to send a strong 
signal to Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui, who had a pro-independence tendency, 
China conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait from July 21, 1995 to March 23, 1996. 
The U.S. sent two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the region to prevent China’s further 
provocation. China’s aggressive behavior during the crisis intensified the rising threat 
perception in Asia and the U.S. 
In Asia, when China built a military facility on Mischief Reef in 1995, ASEAN 
members came up with a strong reaction, worried about the ambition of China’s 
increasing military power.64 There also was a tug of war and territorial dispute between 
Japan and China in Asia, so Japan kept suspicious eyes on rising China. Shintaro Ishihara, 
a Japanese politician, warned in an article that  
In light of China’s rising economic and military might, as well as its 
territorially expansionist policies that directly threaten this island nation, 
Japan can no longer risk placing its security entirely in the hands of 
another power. As a sovereign nation, we must develop an autonomous 
defense capacity of our own.65 
Additionally, internal affairs, such as a growing democratic movement and ethnic 
independence movements in Tibet and Xinjiang begin to threaten China’s development 
and stability.  
In sum, although there was no serious security threat to China from abroad, China 
perceived the security environment as unfavorable during the 1990s. Especially after the 
Tiananmen incident, the country had to confront Western pressure while calming 
domestic dissent.  
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2. After the mid-1990s 
During the 2000s, China’s security environment became more favorable. This was 
due to China’s foreign-policy change toward the international community and 
cooperation with the U.S. Chinese leaders understand that “maintaining peace and 
stability and promoting economic development” are critically important to enhancing 
“the legitimacy and standing of the CCP administration.”66 The more China’s economy 
participates in the international market, the more “pressure for Beijing to emphasize 
compromise and diplomacy rather than threat and conflict.”67 This explains why Beijing 
frequently tries to maintain the regional status quo and “avoids unnecessary 
provocation.”68 
Since the mid-1990s, China has improved its relationship with the U.S. After the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. stands as a sole superpower in the world. 
The U.S. became the most important country thereby, affecting and influencing China’s 
security. Beijing considered that “the radicalization of the Sino–American structural and 
strategic conflicts” were “the fundamental cause for the deterioration of China’s security 
situation.”69 China developed a dilemma in its dealings with the U.S. On one hand, the 
U.S. was a threat to China, with the potential to limit its sovereignty. On the other hand, 
China wanted stability in the Northeast Asian region, in addition to good relations with 
the U.S, to maintain its economic growth. Thus, China wanted to check U.S. influence in 
Asia while improving relations between the two countries.  
Jiang Zemin’s visit to the U.S. in 1997 gave impetus to the improvement of the 
uncomfortable relationship between the two countries since the Tiananmen incident. The 
countries reached an agreement to build a constructive strategic partnership toward the 
21
st
 century. They also announced that they agreed to regular mutual visits, establishing a 
direct phone line between the leaders, expanding economic exchanges, and cooperating 
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on nuclear nonproliferation. President Clinton also visited China in 1998 and further 
consolidated the ties between the two countries. During his visit, the president said that 
“the United States will not support independence for Taiwan; any solution that creates 
two Chinas—or one China and one Taiwan; or its admission to organizations, such as the 
United Nations.”70 The mutual visits of these two leaders meant that the relationship 
between the two countries was finally on a positive track for the first time since the 1989 
Tiananmen incident.  
The September 11, 2001, attack also became a catalyst to improve the relationship 
between the two countries. Since September 11, terrorism has become the main threat to 
U.S. security, and China also started to consider terrorism a national-security threat. 
Some secessionist groups are working in rural areas of China for independence; some of 
them belong to radical terrorist groups, such as the East Turkestan Independence 
Movement (ETIM). Therefore, “counterterrorism has become an important element in 
China’s national security strategy and China has been a constructive participant in the 
international war on terrorism.”71  
By China’s supporting the U.S. war on terrorism, the relationship between the two 
countries has improved, and Colin Powel asserted the relations between the two countries 
were the best ever in 2001. Although there have been some minor conflicts, the two 
countries have achieved mutual benefits through cooperation. 
China’s efforts to cooperate with neighboring countries and the New Security 
Concept (NSC) also contributed to improving the security environment. As a reaction to 
the recognized failures of the 1995/1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences started studying “international security in the post–Cold war period,” and 
foreign minister Qian Qichen first introduced the NSC in 1997 at the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF).72 The NSC includes all security area, such as politics, economy, military, 
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science, technology, and social issues. The contents of the NSC are the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, mutual interest and cooperation in the economy, multilateral 
cooperation through dialogue and collaboration, and the expansion of strategic 
partnership.73 Namely, the cores of NSC are mutual trust, equality, non-intervention, 
cooperation, and sovereignty. This revealed China’s intention that the country would 
respect and cooperate with neighboring countries to encourage peace and development.74 
Since the NSC appeared, Jiang Zemin has especially emphasized that China would 
implement a more active policy toward neighboring countries.75 
China’s response in the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 was a good example 
of China’s efforts to cooperate with neighboring countries. When many Asian countries 
were suffered from the financial crisis of 1997, China showed a responsible attitude 
toward neighboring countries. China chose not to get a competitive edge on their 
suffering neighbors by maintaining the currency peg, and contributed an IMF package to 
help Thailand recover. 76  In contrast to the IMF, which imposed coercive reform to 
suffering countries, China’s actions were welcomed by neighboring countries in the 
region. These initiatives reassured many Asian states that “China’s growing power and 
influence does not pose a threat to the interests of these states.”77 It also led to a change 
in the prevailing image of China in the region from hegemon or threat to responsible 
power.78  
In sum, China had a more favorable security environment during the 2000s. 
Although there still was a Chinese threat perception, China started to being perceived as a 
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responsible superpower in the international community. While checking U.S. hegemony 
in the region, China also could improve its relationship with the U.S.  
C. GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Before the mid-1990s 
China’s foreign policy well reflects the country’s perception of its security 
environment. During the 1990s, China considered that the security environment 
unfavorable for the country. Thus, China maintained a passive attitude in its foreign 
policy. 
China’s foreign policy has changed several times in regard to security-
environment changes. During the early Mao Zedong era, China’s foreign relationships 
were limited to communist countries. China started with good relationships with the 
Soviet Union when Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the country in 1949. After 
ideological and territorial conflicts with the Soviet Union, however, China increased its 
contact with the U.S. in the early 1970s. “With the recovery from the Second World War 
of Europe and Japan and the growth of other large developing states,” China also 
expanded its foreign engagement with the international community.79  
Since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping took the reins of power, economic growth has 
been important in China’s national objective, and Deng set a national strategy for reform 
and opening up. Deng’s plan called for four modernizations (in the economy, agriculture, 
scientific and technological development, and national defense) in addition to the 
liberalization of the economy. To achieve this, China did not concern itself with ideology 
and tried to improve cooperation with developed Western countries. Deng’s famous 
pronouncement “Do not care if the cat is black or white, what matters is it catches mice,” 
represented China’s strategy. Among Western countries, China understood that 
rapprochement with the U.S. could lead other Western countries to invest in China, so the 
country focused their energy on improving their relationship with the U.S..80 
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The opening-up policy in late 1970s also affected China’s interaction with the 
international community in the nonproliferation issue. Until 1970, China considered that 
superpowers used nuclear nonproliferation as a way to monopolize nuclear weapons. 
Thus, in 1963, when three superpowers—the U.S., the Soviet, and the U.K—joined the 
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, China announced a statement against the treaty that it 
fools the world by legalizing their nuclear-weapon manufacturing, storage, and use. 
China’s attitude toward international nonproliferation has changed since the late 1970s. 
China started to participate in the nonproliferation regime by joining IAEA in 1984. The 
country also announced that it would not test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere in 1986. 
However, China still provided little support for the existing nonproliferation regime and 
preferred its own proposal.81 Furthermore, “China was itself the subject of considerable 
nonproliferation concern for many years” due to its willingness to export arms and 
nuclear technology to third-world countries.82 
The growing rapprochement with the West met a big barrier in the Tiananmen 
incident of 1989. Western countries, including the U.S., condemned human-rights abuses 
at the hand of the Chinese government and imposed sanctions on the country. In order to 
cope with this difficulty, Deng came up with a strategy that avoided confrontation with 
the West and concentrated on domestic matters. During this period, the words that can 
best describe China’s national strategy was Deng Xiaoping’s aphorism “hide our 
capabilities and bide our time” (tao guang yang hui). China also emphasized that every 
country should not intervene in any other country’s internal affairs regardless of the 
system, ideology, or values.83 China tried to adhere to an aloof position without any 
intervention in international and local issues that are not directly related to China’s 
national interest. Also, China had a tendency to to maximize its own interests only. This 
keeping-a-low-profile strategy was maintained until the mid-1990s.  
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In sum, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis happened in the 1990s, China 
was still reluctant to raise its voice in international affairs. The country neither wanted to 
be intervened in by other countries, nor wanted to take a leading role in other’s affairs. 
After the opening and reforms in 1978, China increased its interaction with the 
international community. However, the country still hesitated to take part in international 
affairs and kept a low-profile strategy.  
2. After the mid-1990s 
Since the mid-1990s, China has shown a different attitude toward international 
affairs. Improvements in its security environment and China’s self-confidence as a 
national power contributed to this change. “In the late 1990s, Beijing began to encourage 
Chinese firms to go out (zouchuqu) and join the international market, creating global 
brands and joining with foreign partners.”84 Additionally, China became a full member of 
the WTO in 2001, and it left a great impact on China’s economy. Many Chinese 
businessmen recognize that “entry in the WTO has been a focal points that China getting 
on track with the international community.” 85  China’s huge market and unlimited 
potential allowed the country to be one of the largest economic performers in the world. 
At the sixteenth national congress in 2002, Jiang showed confidence in China’s economy 
and emphasized continuing efforts toward economic development. He said that “China 
already accomplished xiaokang [a well-off] society” and should keep putting its effort to 
attain “U.S. $3,000 per capita gross domestic product by 2020.”86  
China’s fourth-generation leaders, who succeeded to power in the early 2000s, 
have also maintained these tendencies. In 2002–2003, “many top leaders retired and 
passed power to the next generation.”87 In October 2002, Jiang Zemin passed power to 
Hu Jintao in the sixteenth central committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Also, Hu 
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Jinato was formally elected as Chinese president in the tenth National People’s Congress, 
and new Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, formed a fourth-generation cabinet in 2003. The 
new Hu Jintao regime placed considerable emphasis on China’s economic development 
and national power, so to show confidence in China’s future. Right after election as 
president of China, Hu Jintao visited neighboring countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Mongolia) and took part in a G8 summit in France from 26 May to 5 June to show 
China’s volition that the country would actively engage with neighboring countries and in 
the international community. Premier Zhu Rongji also expressed the confidence during 
the 10th National People’s Congress opening address in March 2003 by saying that China 
will stand shoulder to shoulder with great powers such as the U.S. and the European 
Union in the near future.88 
Since 1980s, the words that best describe China’s foreign policy are Deng 
Xiaoping’s aphorism “hide our capabilities and bide our time.” However, in the early 
2000s, Hu Jintao emphasized the need to “to do some things” (you suo zuo wei) and 
“peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) )—later “peaceful development” (heping fazhen)—in  
foreign affairs. The tao guang yang hui and heping jueqi have similarities, in that their 
key goals are maintain China’s continued economic growth and development and 
mitigate the Chinese threat that is increased  with the rise of China. However, in the 
process of achieve key goals, tao guang yang hui tries a passive approach, whereas 
heping jueqi tries an aggressive approach. The former emphasized that in order to ensure 
continued growth, China should avoid unnecessary conflict with another countries. It also 
expressed that the way to be a superpower in the U.S.-centric international system is to 
cooperate with other countries through multilateral institutions, rather than challenge U.S. 
hegemony. On the other hand, heping jueqi reflects China’s position that China should 
have a reasonable position and influence in the international community with the 
country’s national-power growth. China’s new leadership has emphasized that China’s 
development does not pose a threat to regional safety and it would rather contribute to 
peacekeeping in the region. Thus, after domestic debates on terminology, China’s leaders 
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have used “peaceful development” (heping fazhan) rather than heping jueqi to offer a 
reassuring, peaceful image to other nations. The country also has emphasized that it 
would be a responsible great power that plays a leading role in regional security affairs.89 
Therefore, China has approached the North Korean nuclear issue and the six-party talks 
in terms of a peace-oriented, responsible power. China also realized that being recognized 
as a regional power should precede becoming a world power.90The Chinese government 
believes that “it should play an active role in the negotiations to achieve a dominant 
position in the North East Asian area.”91  
China’s active involvement in international affairs also brought positive change in 
China’s attitude toward nonproliferation. There is still a “gap between Beijing’s public 
pronouncement on nonproliferation and its reported proliferation activities, raising 
questions about China’s commitment and intentions.”92 China is still a key supplier of 
weapons-of-mass-destruction technologies and their delivering systems. However, to 
cooperate with the international community, China needed to follow international 
regulations. Thus, China agreed to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 
1996, joined the Zangger Committee in 1997, and became a member of the NSG in 2004. 
A number of bureaucracies in China also expanded their participation in 
international arms control and nonproliferation.93  Additionally, China established the 
department of Arms Control and Disarmament, which is exclusively devote in the issue, 
in 1997. Although China’s changing attitude toward the nonproliferation regime was the 
result of foreign pressure, the country considered a constructive role in CTBT as 
important to achieving international status as a responsible great power.94 
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Mostly, China’s active involvement in international affairs could be found in its 
increasing engagement in multilateral institutions. With the emergence of NSC in the 
mid-1990s, China’s attitude toward multilateralism changed from passive observer to 
active participant., China showed an especially active attitude toward regional 
multilateral institutions and emphasized the need to “strengthen regional cooperation and 
push interaction and cooperation with neighboring states to a new horizon” in the report 
of the sixteenth CCP Congress.”95 China realized that it could play a leading role in 
regional institutions, and that that would be beneficial to China’s national interest. It also 
“demonstrates its high comfort level in interaction with like-minded neighboring 
countries and desire to cement a web of multilateral relations with them.”96 With the 
foreign-policy change toward multilateral institutions, China became more involved with 
neighboring countries in economy and security affairs. By the mid-1990s, China had 
joined 80% of international organizations.97 
In sum, China’s engagement in international affairs has increased since the mid-
1990s. China’s leaders started to have confidence in their comprehensive national power 
and tried to act as a responsible superpower. These changes were expressed as China’s 
active involvement in multilateral institutions. China has played an especially crucial role 
in regional multilateral institutions.  
D. RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND NORTH KOREA 
The Korean peninsula, which still experiences military tension and confrontation 
between two the Koreas, is closely associated with the security of Northeast Asia. The 
deterioration in stability of the Korean peninsula could develop into cross-checks and an 
arms race among the countries of Northeast Asia and threaten the overall security of the 
region. Additionally, the influence of the U.S. and China has been felt acutely in the 
peninsula. China, which borders with North Korea, is well aware of the importance of the 
peninsula. 
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The relations between China and North Korea are often called “close as teeth and 
lips,” and have conflicted or developed depending on historical circumstances, the 
international situation, and mutual interests. Since the two countries established 
diplomatic relations in 1949, they have maintained close relations politically, 
economically, and militarily. China and North Korea are bound by ideology and 
geography, and their brothers-in-arms relationship was in evidence during the Korean 
War. However, since North Korea has failed to manage its economy and has caused some 
troubles, some Chinese have started to see North Korea from a different perspective, and 
there have been some changes in their relationship. 
1. Before the mid-1990s 
From the start, the two countries have maintained a closed relationship based on 
communist ideology. Kim Il-sung and many North Korean leaders cooperated with China 
and fought together against Japan during the colonial period. The strong relationship 
between China and North Korea was further reinforced during the Korean War. “China’s 
sense of vulnerability along the Korean Peninsula was reinforced by swift United States 
intervention, especially when General Douglas MacArthur’s forces crossed the Thirty-
Eight Parallel and approached the Chinese border.”98 Despite many Chinese leaders’ 
opposition, Mao dispatched 850,000 soldiers to North Korea to defend the country. 
Furthermore, “while the hot phase of the Korean War lasted three years, Chinese forces 
remained on the peninsula for an additional five years (until 1958), many assisting in 
national reconstruction projects.”99 The two countries with same communism ideology 
stood against the West during the Cold War. Their geographic position intensifies the 
importance of North Korea. China considers North Korea a buffer zone that prevents 
direct confrontation with the U.S. In the early 1960s, the Sino–Soviet conflict increased 
the importance of North Korea. While China was struggling with the Soviet Union over 
ideology and borders, North Korea’s support was very important. The two countries 
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allied with a mutual defense treaty in 1961. According to the treaty, if North Korea were 
attacked by others, China was supposed to intervene automatically.  
Since Deng Xiaoping adopted reform and opening up policy, however, China’s 
foreign policy toward North Korea is no longer restricted by ideology. Thus, the 
relationship between the two countries has been transformed from blood alliance to a 
realistic one that has emphasized national interest, and there have been some growing 
discrepancies in their relationship. While China improved its relationship with Western 
countries, North Korea only focused on its relationship with socialist countries. North 
Korea relied on, and got substantial aid from, the Soviet Union more than China.  
The normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea also 
temporarily worsened Sino–North Korea relationships. The relationship between China 
and South Korea has greatly improved since the two countries established diplomatic ties 
in 1992. The increasing trade volume between them was the leading incentive for the 
relationship’s development. “Between 1989 and 2001, for instance, Korea’s merchandise 
exports to China grew from $1.3 billion to $18.2 billion while China’s merchandise 
exports to Korea grew from $472 million to $12.5 billion.”100  
The tension between China and North Korea, which was caused by South Korea, 
however, did not last long. Despite Sino–South Korea diplomatic ties, North Korea still 
needs China’s diplomatic support. With the worsening situation in food and energy 
supplies, North Korea also needs China’s aid. Thus, North Korea refrained from 
deteriorating its relationship with China, and China also tried to maintain close ties with 
North Korea.  
2. After the mid-1990s 
Since the mid-1990s, China’s general foreign-policy change also affected its 
policy toward North Korea. By solidifying its position as a responsible superpower, 
China would draw international support and cooperation, which are important for 
continuous economic development. This aspect limited China’s support for North 
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Korea’s military adventurism, terror activities, and development of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). In contrast, China increased its influence toward North Korea in the 
areas of economic aid and trade.  
In 1996, China decided to give North Korea 500,000 tons of food per year until 
2000 and loaned North Korea 40 to 60 million dollars per year. China became the most 
important trading partner to North Korea. In 1990, China shared only 11.6% of North 
Korea’s total trade, but the share increased 25–30% during the 1990s.101 After Kim Jong-
il and Jiang Zemin exchanged visits in 2001, the trade between the two countries 
increased 51.6% over the previous year. As of 2004, among the total North Korean trade 
volume, 30% of food and almost 100% of oil were imported from China. North Korea’s 
economic dependency on China has continued to increase. According to the Korean 
Trade-Investment Agency, North Korea relied on China for 89% of its total trade in 
2011. 102  North Korea’s economic dependency on China has prevented its collapse. 
Although North Korea has tried to establish a self-reliant economic structure, 
international trade is very important in North Korea’s economy. Sixty percent of North 
Koreans live in urban areas, and the country has an industrialized economy in which the 
mining and manufacturing industries share 35% of the total economy.103 In order to 
maintain this economic structure, North Korea must import natural resources, machines, 
and high technology from abroad. Food shortages are also a very severe problem in North 
Korea. Thus, North Korea needs foreign sources that can supply those items, and China is 
the country that can play that role. Although China’s influence over North Korea was still 
limited, North Korea became heavily reliant on Chinese trade and food aid.  
China also tries to encourage North Korea to involve them more in economic 
reform. Since the 2000s, many North Korean senior delegations have visited China’s 
special economic zone and concluded with a positive assessment of China’s economic 
reform. Additionally, China supported the development of special economic zones (SEZ) 
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on Rajin-Sonbong, Hwanggumpyong Island, and Wihwa Island in connection with the 
northeastern provinces development plan in China. Thus, “North Korea’s economic 
dependencies on China will likely increase with more and more Chinese companies 
advancing into the SEZ on the back of government support.”104 
China’s increasing influence over North Korea has not only been confined to 
friendly ways. China stands its ground that the country will not sacrifice its national 
interest to North Korea’s. Thus, China pressured North Korea indirectly by letting 
scholars’ argue whether the relationship between the two countries should be 
reestablished. Traditionally, China has considered North Korea a crucial buffer state, but 
some experts started to insist that North Korea is more a threat than buffer zone in 
China’s stability. North Korea’s failed economy and large number of refugees impose a 
burden on China. Some experts even suggest that North Korea cleverly uses this “threat 
to collapse” as leverage to limit China’s influence. Thus, “the liability school” criticized 
North Korea that “while China carries a heavy economic burden in aiding North Korea 
on a permanent basis, Pyongyang has shown little gratitude in return.”105  
Some Chinese scholars presented a very antagonistic attitude toward the North 
Korean regime. Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations and director of the 
Center on American Studies at Renmin University of China, claimed that “China could 
benefit in the long term from North Korea’s collapse.” If North Korea were to collapse, 
South Korea would “take over the country” and would “naturally gravitate toward 
Beijing and away from Japan and the United States.” Thus, he argues that “the collapse 
of North Korea would lead U.S. troops to leave the peninsula and China’s influence over 
northeast Asia would rise.”106 Although China did not allow the scholars to be extremely 
hostile toward North Korea, the liability school’s claim reflected China’s attitude that it is 
possible to abandon North Korea if the country does not follow China’s opinion.  
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In some ways, China showed an aggressive attitude in forcing their will on North 
Korea. In 2002, North Korea decided to turn Sinuiju city, which is the capital of North 
Pyeongan Province, into a special administrative region and chose Yang Bin, a Chinese-
Dutch businessman who was listed as the second richest man in China, to govern and 
lead the economic development of the city. However, shortly after his appointment, 
China arrested him on charges of tax evasion and it caused a setback in North Korea’ 
Sinuiju project.107 This incident well reflected China’s position that China would not 
allow North Korea to undermine its interest.  
Despite some uneasy relationships between the two countries, however, China 
still recognizes the strategic importance of North Korea. China considers that if North 
Korea’s regime collapsed, the U.S. would take the hegemony on the Korean Peninsula. 
Since China still considers the U.S. a potential threat, China does not want to confront the 
U.S. on the border. Thus, although North Korea condemned China’s reform and 
provoked instability on the Korean peninsula, China opposed sanctions that could 
collapse the North Korean regime, supported North Korea with energy and food, and 
advocated North Korea’s position in the international community.108 Normally, China’s 
foreign policy toward North Korea is based on national interest. However, when an 
important issue related to national security happens, the two countries cooperate and 
support each other as a unit bound together by a common destiny.  
In conclusion, since the mid-1990s, China’s attitude toward North Korea 
coincided with China’s general foreign policy. China tried to be a responsible super 
power and increase its influence in the region. Thus, while limiting its support of North 
Korea’s provocation, China increased its influence over North Korea in the economic 
field. As China increased its aid and trade with North Korea, it became the number-one 
aiding country and trading partner to North Korea, making North Korea dependent on 
China in their relationship.  
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E. CHINA’S POSITION TOWARD THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR 
ISSUE 
China has advocated three basic principles—maintaining peace and stability, 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and peaceful solutions through negotiation—
about the North Korean nuclear issue. This is not just because of other countries’ requests 
or a pure desire for peace. It reflects China’s strategy for its national interests.  
First, “maintaining peace and stability” shows China’s basic perception toward 
the North Korean nuclear issue. In order to achieve continuous economic growth, China 
needs peace and stability in the region. The crisis caused by North Korea’s provocation 
would bring nothing beneficial to China’s national interest. Thus, China emphasized 
peace and stability during the nuclear crisis.  
Second, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is important for China’s 
national security. China considers that the North Korean nuclear program would 
gradually become a threat to China’s security. North Korea’s possession of nuclear 
weapons could lead to nuclear proliferation in East Asia. If South Korea, Japan, and 
Taiwan seek to possess nuclear weapons, China’s national objective, which is economic 
development in peace and stability, confronts big challenges. Especially since China has 
emphasized that it will use military force in unification with Taiwan, Taiwanese 
possession of nuclear weapons is unacceptable to China.  
If North Korea provokes tension in the region with nuclear weapons, it would 
definitely lead to U.S. intervention, and China would directly confront the U.S. 
Additionally, if North Korea fails to control its nuclear weapons, separatists in China 
could obtain the weapons and use them for terrorism. North Korean nuclear weapons are 
basically aimed to counter the U.S. threat, but they can be a danger to China if the 
relationship with Korea deteriorates in the future. Some Chinese scholars even point out 
that China may consider “the element of nuclear weapon diplomacy” with North Korea 
or a reunified Korea in the future.109 For these reasons, China has objected to North 
Korea’s nuclear possession. 
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Third, negotiation is the best way to solve the crisis while maintaining peace and 
stability. North Korea’s nuclear ambition has led to sanctions from the international 
community and imposes a big burden on North Korea’s regime. Furthermore, China is 
concerned that the U.S. could use military force to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis 
fundamentally. If this happens, North Korea may not maintain its current regime. 
Although a few scholars present different opinions, the regime collapse of North Korea is 
“the last thing the Chinese want.” 110 It would lead to a massive refugee influx to China, 
civil war within North Korea, or arms conflicts between the two Koreas. These 
instabilities would lead to serious harmful effects on China’s national interests, so China 
has stressed a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.  
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IV. CHINA ENGAGES IN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 
Since the mid-1990s, China’s attitude toward multilateralism has changed. China 
started to have confidence in its growing comprehensive national power, and expanded 
its engagement with the international community. The New Security Concept, which 
emphasizes mutual cooperation with neighboring countries, made China play a leading 
role in regional multilateral institutions. Notably China has increased its cooperation with 
ASEAN Plus three and Central Asian countries. These changes also affected China’s 
attitude toward the North Korean nuclear issue. China not only was involved in the Six-
Party Talks, but also has hosted them and put effort into their success. This chapter will 
examine what factors have affected China’s attitude change toward multilateralism, 
China’s involvement in regional multilateral institutions, and China’s goals in the six-
party talks. 
A. FACTORS THAT AFFECTED CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD 
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE 
1. The Relationship with the U.S. 
Cooperation with the U.S. is important for China to maintain continuous 
development. As its double-digit economic growth in the past 20 years shows, China is 
the main beneficiary of globalization and international free trade. Thus, in order to 
maintain a high level of economic growth, China needs to collaborate with the U.S.-led 
world economic order.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the U.S. considered China a new 
rival. The U.S. had doubts about China’s military expansion, and the Bush administration 
designated China as a strategic competitor. Additionally, China’s human-rights issues led 
the two countries into conflict. Since September 11, however, the relationship between 
the U.S. and China has improved. China has showed willingness in maintaining a stable 
relationship with the U.S. by joining the international anti-terrorism coalition led by the 
U.S.  
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This also affects China’s attitude toward North Korean nuclear provocation. 
China does not want North Korea to provoke trouble that can cause conflicts with the U.S. 
However, China has also tried to limit U.S. influence in the region. Furthermore, with its 
growing economy and national power, China has tried to increase its own influence in the 
region. The China-led Shanghai Cooperative Organization is a good example of China’s 
intention. Through this organization, China could check U.S. influence and increase 
China’s influence in the Central Asian region. Therefore, the improving relationship with 
the U.S. is not the most important reason for China’s attitude change in the North Korean 
nuclear issue. 
2. The Expanding Trade with South Korea 
China’s improving economic cooperation with South Korea might provide a 
positive effect in China’s efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis. During the 
2000s, the trade volume between China and South Korea increased greatly. China and 
South Korea normalized their diplomatic relationship in 1992, and since then the two 
countries have maintained good relations. Thus, there are few differences in their 
relationship between the first and second North Korean nuclear crises.  
Furthermore, China tries to maintain a balance between the two Koreas. While 
focused on economic cooperation with South Korea, China still places great importance 
on North Korea in the political field. Thus, since the mid-1990s, China and North Korea 
had increased their mutual high-official visits. Zhang Zemin’s visit to North Korea in 
2001 was an especially important event that proved the reconcilement of the two 
countries’ relationship. That was the first visit of a Chinese top leader since 1992, and the 
two countries agreed to upgrade their mutual cooperation.111  
Thus, the improving trade between China and South Korea is not crucial to 
explaining China’s foreign-policy change on the North Korean nuclear issue.  
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3. China’s Attitude toward the Nonproliferation Regime.  
Since the mid-1990s, China has shown an active attitude toward the 
nonproliferation regime. China agreed to take part in CTBT and established institutions 
exclusively for nonproliferation. These changes were related to China’s national interest. 
When China tested nuclear weapon during the 1990s, neighboring countries criticized 
them and pressured them not to test. For the sake of China’s international image and 
long-term gains in Chinese security, China needed to response neighboring countries’ 
claims and follow the nonproliferation rule. Therefore, China’s attitude change toward 
the nonproliferation regime was the result of China’s efforts to improve its image.  
In conclusion, various factors might have influenced China’s attitude change 
toward the North Korean nuclear issue. While maintaining a good relationship with the 
U.S. and neighboring countries, China tried to limit U.S. influence and increase its 
leverage in the Asian region. This led China’s active involvement in regional multilateral 
institutions.  
B. CHINA’S ATTITUDE CHANGE TOWARD MULTILATERALISM 
During the 2000s, China actively engaged in multilateral institutions and came up 
with the six-party talks in the second North Korean nuclear crisis. What, then, is 
multilateralism, and how has China’s perception toward multilateralism changed?  
Robert O. Keohane defines multilateralism nominally as “the practice of 
coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc 
arrangement or by means of institutions.”112 John Gerard Ruggie offers a qualitative 
definition of that “institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more 
states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.” 113  Miles Kahler defines 
multilateralism as “international governance of the many” with a central principle of 
“opposition to bilateral discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the 
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leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict.”114 In order 
words, multilateralism means more than three countries that have different national 
interests coordinating and pursuing international order based on principles and norms. 
China’s perception toward multilateralism has changed over time. China’s 
perspective on multilateral frameworks has four principles: 1) no targeting of other 
countries, 2) noninterference in other nations’ domestic affairs, 3) peaceful dispute 
resolution, and 4) consultation among nations as equals. 115  China’s multilateral 
diplomacy started in 1971, when the country entered into the UN and became recognized 
as a sovereign country in the international community. However, Beijing took a stance 
against international cooperative institutions, because Chinese leaders believed that a few 
Western countries dominated the power in international institutions and controlled them 
in favor of their preference. Thus, the Chinese believed that their country had been taken 
advantage of by international institutions, and Chinese elites were hostile to liberalism 
and international organizations which try to solve international affairs through 
interdependence and multilateralism.116  
Some regional conflicts also hindered China’s active participation in regional 
multilateral institutions. Beijing worried that “ASEAN might use the forum to 
internationalize the Spratly Islands dispute and take a united stance against China.”117 
Also, Beijing was uneasy about the possibility that “the Taiwan issue might be included 
in the ARF agenda.”118  Thus, China had a very negative feeling toward multilateral 
international organizations and preferred bilateral diplomacy, as compare to multilateral. 
The country adopted partial multilateralism when needed and took a passive position, 
                                                 
114 Miles Kahler, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,” International Organization, 46, 3 
(Summer 1992): 681. 
115 Chang-hoon Cha, “China and Multilateral Security Institutions: Perspective, Process, and Progress,” 
Korea Observer 35. 2 (July 2004): 320. 
116 Suk-hee Han, “China’s Korea Policy during the Post - Cold War era ; China`s National Interests , 
Peaceful neighbor environment and Policy toward Korea,” Yonsei Journal of Social Science, vol.7 no. 1 
(2001): 73. 
117 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, 
and Aspiration,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27. 1 (Apr 2005): 106. 
118 Ibid. 
 47 
especially in security multilateralism. The country also maintained non-alliance as the 
cornerstone of its foreign policy, and therefore did not become actively involved in 
multilateral cooperation. 119  Thus, the pattern of China’s attitude toward multilateral 
institutions was passive and reactive. 
With the advent of a new security concept that emphasized mutual cooperation 
with neighboring countries, however, China changed its attitude toward international 
institutions and started to deal with various issues through multilateral institutions. China 
joined with ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea to create a new regional institution called 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT). Namely, China realized that multilateral diplomacy is 
beneficial to China’s national interest. One Chinese analyst argues that “China can free 
ride on the provision of certain international and regional public goods.”120  Another 
concluded that “China is by no means a challenger to the current international order. 
Under the current international system and norms, China can ensure its own national 
interests.”121  The problems that occurred during continuous development and reform 
could be solved more easily through international cooperation.122  
The 15th national congress of the Communist Party of China in 1997 well 
reflected China’s change in perception towards multilateral cooperation. Jiang Zemin 
considered that economic growth is the prime national objective to China. Throughout 
the congress, he emphasized multilateralism as a way to increase China’s external 
economic growth.123  
Table 1.   China’s position changes on multilateral diplomacy (From 12th to 16th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China) 
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Support world peace and development, and international dispute resolution by 
UN security council 
15th 
(1997) 




Actively participate in multilateral activities, and play an active role in 
international organizations. 
Source : Tae-hwan Lee, “China on Northeast Asian Multilateral security,” The Sejong Institute 
Policy Reports vol.67 (2006): 8. 
C. REGIONAL MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS AND CHINA 
China uses multilateral institutions “as mechanisms for reassurance, gaining 
access to key economic inputs, limiting U.S. influence in certain regions, and expanding 
China’s regional influence in general.”124 Thus, since the mid-1990s, China has joined 
“various trade and security accords deepened its participation in key multilateral 
organization.”125 China not only takes part in various multilateral institutions, but also 
plays a crucial role in creating new institutions. China’s involvement in multilateral 
institutions in Asia includes the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (1991), the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (1994), ASEAN+1 (ASEAN plus China) (1996), 
ASEAN+3 (1997), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (2001), and the East Asia 
Summit (EAS) (2005). Among those institutions, ARF and SCO well reflect China’s 
position on regional multilateral security cooperation. 
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1. The ARF 
China’s attitude change toward multilateral security institutions was first noticed 
when Beijing showed its confidence in the ARF.126 Unlike APEC, the ARF is focused on 
promoting regional security cooperation and reflects China’s strategy in the East Asian 
region. The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994, with the 
objective to “foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues 
of common interest and concern” and “to make significant contributions to efforts 
towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”127   
At first, China had some suspicions about security institutions, whether they could 
undermine China’s sovereignty. When China joined the ARF in 1994, the country had to 
confront two serious concerns. One was the worry about the “China threat” sentiment 
among the member nations. Against the background of China’s rise, “the U.S., Japan, and 
even Southeast Asian countries might employ the ARF to check and contain a stronger 
China.”128 By entering this regional multilateral institution, China also worried about the 
possibility of confronting objections about their military modernization. Thus, China had 
some suspicions about the institution.  
The second worry was related to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China 
did not want to put the territorial dispute issue on the agenda because it might lead 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam to “form a united front against China with the 
support of other Southeast Asian countries and possibly the United States and Japan.”129 
By entering this regional multilateral institution, China has could confront objections 
about their military modernization and South China Sea territorial dispute with other 
member nations. Rather than territorial dispute, China wants the cooperation of non-
traditional security arenas to be the main agenda for this institution.  
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After attending the forum several times, however, China realized that “these 
forums, which feature a consultative mode of interaction and are led by the ASEAN 
states rather than the United States and Japan, might not be harmful to its national 
interests.” 130  China even has used the ARF as a means to “question U.S. bilateral 
alliances in the region” and “counter the perceived U.S. containment strategy.” 131 
“China’s desire to hedge against a perceived U.S. encirclement campaign further 
increased its resolve to promote these policy goals.”132  
Beijing concluded that the institution is beneficial for promoting China’s foreign-
policy objectives, peaceful-rise image, and stable security environment. Chinese foreign 
minister Li Zhaoxing mentioned “cooperative security” at the ARF speech in July 2005, 
namely, that to achieve the goal of joint security, the international community should 
respect the diversity of each other, build mutual trust, and secure each other through 
dialogue and negotiation. 133   These judgments have led China’s attitude toward 
multilateral institutions to change from passive observer to active participant. By 
emphasizing dialogue and cooperation, China’s rise would be an opportunity rather than 
a threat to neighbouring countries.134  
China also played a role in setting up the East Asia Summit (EAS). The U.S. has 
not played a role in establishing the summit, nor was it invited to attend. When the 
ASEAN Plus three countries agreed in November 2004 to convene the EAS, it was seen 
as “evidence that China was taking advantage of regionalism to dominate the region.”135 
Bruce Vaughn, an analyst of Southeast and South Asian affairs, reported in the 
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Congressional Research Service, for example, that “The EAS is viewed as important . . . 
for its potential importance as an indicator of China’s raising geopolitical importance.”136  
China’s engagement in the ARF shows that China is willing to increase its 
influence in the East Asian region through a regional multilateral institution. Since the 
North Korean nuclear crisis would undermine the stability of the Asian region, China also 
needed to settle down the crisis. Thus, China also increased its engagement in the North 
Korean nuclear issue through the six-party talks. 
2. The SCO 
The SCO reflects China’s interest in the Central Asian region. The SCO was 
founded in 2001 to increase cooperation among six countries (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), and China played a crucial role in its 
establishment. The SCO covers “a total area of more than 30 million square kilometers, 
or three-fifths of Eurasia, with a population of 1.455 billion, almost a quarter of the 
world’s human beings, and $1.57 trillion of GDP.”137 Geographically, China shares over 
3,300-kilometer of its western border with Central Asian countries, so it acknowledges 
the importance of the relationship with these countries. 
Since the five Central Asian countries gained their independence from the former 
Soviet Union, China has maintained a strategy toward those countries that sustains 
friendly, neighborly relations and expands economic ties. In 1994, Chinese premier Li 
Peng suggested four principles to manage Chinese–Central Asian relations: “(1) peaceful 
coexistence and good-neighborly relations; (2) promotion of mutually beneficial 
cooperation; (3) non-interference in domestic affairs; and (4) respect for one another’s 
independence and sovereignty.”138 In this respect, China has been active supporter of the 
SCO. 
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Unlike the European Union, in which cooperation in “economic integration 
gradually spilled over to political and security area,” the SCO was originally established 
to solve border conflicts among China, Russia, and Central Asian countries, and has 
expanded its field to political diplomacy, economy, and security issues.139 Since China is 
eager to secure its imports of energy resources, the Central Asian region has become 
important due to its large amount of oil and natural gas.140 The area also has the potential 
to grow as a useful market. Thus, Jiang Zemin described “security cooperation and 
economic cooperation as two indispensable wheels of SCO.”141 Additionally, to suppress 
Islamist separatism in Xinjiang Uygur and maintain the integrity of the nation, China is 
actively involved in SCO antiterrorism cooperation.142 In order to improve antiterrorism 
cooperation, “China pioneered a joint military exercise among SCO members.”143 In sum, 
the SCO advanced from a “one-dimensional security-consulting mechanism to a 
comprehensive formal regional organization.”144  
China’s engagement in the SCO shows that China is willing to increase its 
influence in Central Asian through a regional multilateral institution. China played a 
leading role in establishing the SCO from the beginning and succeeded in developing it 
as a regional security and economic multilateral institution. This successful case would 
give confidence to China in regard to a leading role in regional multilateral institutions 
and give positive impetus to China’s leading role in the six-party talks. 
3. China’s Goals 
The goals of China’s regional security policy are as follows: maintain the 
equilibrium of strategic capabilities while avoiding a full-scale confrontation and arms 
race with the United States, prevent military conflicts and promote the status of China in 
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the region, and strengthen China’s leading role in regional security through the 
establishment of a new cooperative-security regime.145 
First, China can hedge against the U.S. through multilateral institutions in the 
Asian region. After the Soviet Union collapsed and Cold War ended, the U.S. became the 
unipolar power in the world and has increased its influence in Asia. Chinese analysts 
characterized the world-power configuration as “one superpower (the United States), 
many great powers (Europe, Japan, China, and Russia).”146 China is not strong enough to 
counter the U.S. by herself, so Beijing has realized that direct confrontation with the U.S. 
does not meet its national interest. However, China confronts many issues with the U.S. 
in the region. China is concerned with its growing insecurity in peripheral areas due to 
U.S. support to Taiwan, the U.S.–Japan security alliance, and missile-defense systems. 
Thus, China gives importance to multilateral security cooperation as an effective means 
to counter U.S. pressure or military alliances and lessen American status in the region.147  
Beijing tries to avoid confrontation and an arms race with the U.S., but 
condemned U.S. hegemony and unilateralism by checking the through regional 
cooperative institutions. “China’s desire to hedge against a perceived U.S. encirclement 
campaign further increased its resolve to promote these policy goals.”148 As Thomas J. 
Christensen insists, “China has been encouraged to improve relations with its neighbors 
diplomatically and economically at least in part as a hedge against U.S. power and the 
fear of encirclement by a coalition led by the United States.” 149  As a result, 
multilateralism became a main direction and goal in Chinese diplomacy. 
Second, China tries to establish its own image as a “peaceful rise” by participating 
in multilateral institutions. Yiwei Wang argues that China’s new strategic thinking, what 
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is called “China’s peaceful rise,” is the factor that determines China’s foreign policy 
toward North Korea.150  The security element of the peaceful rise asserts that China 
would endeavor to promote security cooperation in the East Asian region because 
stability in this region and cooperation with neighboring countries are important for the 
continuous development of China.151 Basically, multilateral institutions seek to avoid 
international conflict and attempt to come up with peaceful solution. Thus, by actively 
participating in multilateral institutions, China can calm neighboring countries’ concerns 
over the rising Chinese threat. At a press conference during the annual session of China’s 
national legislature in 2004, Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing said that “China 
supports multilateralism and is committed to multilateral cooperation,” because 
“multilateralism is an effective way to deal with common challenges for humanity, while 
unilateralism proves to be not popular.”152 
As the interdependent relationship between the countries in the region has grown, 
the need for mutual-security cooperation for coordinated response to various problems 
such as drugs, environment, and resource problems has increased.153 Swaine argues that 
Beijing recognized that “multilateral initiatives can facilitate efforts to deal with common 
problems and opportunities (for example, domestic terrorist activities, nontraditional 
security concerns, and resource and territorial disputes).” These initiatives also can 
“reassure many Asian states that China’s growing power and influence does not pose a 
threat to the interests of these states.”154 
The third goal is promoting the status of China by actively participating in 
regional institutions. With its growing comprehensive national power, China also needs 
to increase its power in the region. Furthermore, based on economic development, China 
can expand its influence and lead the institution to the country’s favor. Avery insists that 
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China is actively pursuing multilateralism as a tool to perform a grand strategy that is 
designed to “engineer the country’s rise to the status of a true great power that shapes, 
rather than simply responds to, the international system.”155 This point makes China play 
a leading role in regional multilateral institutions. 
China realized that multilateral diplomacy is beneficial for China’s national 
interests, and problems that occurred during continuous development and reform could be 
solved more easily through international cooperation.156   Thus, since the mid-1990s, 
China has joined “various trade and security accords [that have] deepened its 
participation in key multilateral organization.”157 
D. THE SIX-PARTY TALKS 
China came up with the six-party talks as a solution to the North Korean nuclear 
crisis. The six-party talks well reflect China’s intention to participate in Northeast Asian 
security cooperation.  
During the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, China did not put 
efforts towards settling the crisis and only declared its principles, such as 
denuclearization of the peninsula and a peaceful solution. China also insisted that the U.S. 
and North Korea should solve the problem through bilateral negotiation. The country did 
not put effort into solving the problem in conjunction with multilateral security 
cooperation in Northeast Asia.158 
During the second North Korean nuclear crisis, however, China’s attitude toward 
the crisis had changed from bystander to main participant. China tried to settle the crisis 
through multilateral security cooperation. China realized that the North Korean nuclear 
issue is the most difficult and complex problem among many issues, so if China could 
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solve this problem properly, other problems in Northeast Asia could be solved more 
easily. The Six-Party Talks include all major countries in the region, and they try to 
reflect their security interest through cooperation. Thus, China expected that if the talks 
settled the North Korean nuclear crisis, the countries would increase their mutual trust. 
To solve North Korea’s nuclear issue, six nations—the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, 
and two Koreas—constitute the Six-Party Talks. Although the U.S. first proposed 
multilateral cooperation in North Korea’s nuclear issue, China is the host country of the 
Six-Party Talks. Through the Six-Party Talks, China can share the burden with other 
countries and balance U.S. unilateral influence. Furthermore, by leading the Six-Party 
Talks, China can promote its peaceful image and increase its influence in Asia. Emerging 
as a great power while neighboring countries has worried about the China threat, the 
country has emphasized that China is promoting security and peace in the region. Thus, 
the Six-Party Talks are a good way to show that China can promote its role as a great, 
responsible power.  
1. The Beginning of the Six-Party Talks 
Unlike the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, the U.S. and North 
Korea could not find a consensus in the second crisis in the early 2000s. The U.S. refused 
to have bilateral talks with North Korea until the country completely abandoned its 
nuclear program. In response to this hardline stance, North Korea came up with every 
strong provocation, such as withdrawing from NPT, expelling IAEA inspectors, and 
producing plutonium. 
While tension persisted, the U.S., North Korea, and China held trilateral talks in 
Beijing on April 23, 2003. China played a crucial role in convening the trilateral talks. 
China worried that if the U.S. tried to solve the crisis through military means or economic 
sanctions, the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia could worsen 
seriously. It would also undermine China’s economic development and social stability. 
By arbitrating the differences between the U.S. and North Korea, China tried to increase 
its influence over North Korea and improve relations with the U.S. Resolving the North 
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Korean nuclear issue through dialogue also could be beneficial to China because it makes 
the country be seen as a responsible great power in the international community.  
To prevent aggravation of the situation and induce North Korea to participate in 
the talks, China used pressure and incentives at the same time. In early 2003, North 
Korea adhered to its position of participating in bilateral talks with the U.S. and rejected 
trilateral talks. Then China cut off the crude-oil pipeline to North Korea for three days. 
China announced officially that the pipeline cutoff was a technical problem, but some 
experts believe that China used the oil to pressure North Korea. 159  China next sent 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Deputy Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, and the 
director general of the department of Asian affairs, Fu Ying, to Kim Jong-il to persuade 
North Korea to come to the table. Since North Korea depends on China for most of its oil 
supply, it would be hard for North Korea to ignore China’s pressure. 
During the trilateral talks, the U.S. and North Korea failed to narrow their 
differences on the issue. North Korea told the U.S. delegation for the first time that the 
country possesses nuclear weapons. Pyongyang called for “a U.S.–North Korean 
nonaggression treaty, U.S. respect for North Korea’s sovereignty, and U.S. willingness 
not to obstruct the North’s economic relations with other countries and relevant 
international financial institutions.”160 North Korea insisted that if the U.S. switches its 
hostile policy toward North Korea, Pyongyang would cooperate with the U.S. by 
abandoning its nuclear program. However, the U.S. delegation clarified that it would not 
make any concession until North Korea first abandoned its nuclear program completely.  
Although the U.S. and North Korea did not concede their positions, the trilateral 
talks succeeded in getting North Korea to the table for the Six-Party talks. The U.S. 
proposed a multilateral solution to the North Korean nuclear issue with major Northeast 
Asian countries. Neighboring countries also wanted to maintain stability in the Korean 
peninsula, and so agreed to participate in multilateral talks. North Korea wanted Russia to 
be a member of the talks to check China, and China requested that Japan take part. Japan 
                                                 
159 Sang-Jin Shin, “China’s Six-Party Talks Strategy,” National Strategy, vol.12, no. 2 (2005): 38. 
160 Alan D. Romberg and Michael D. Swaine, “The North Korea nuclear crisis: A strategy for 
negotiation,” Arms Control Today 33. 4 (May 2003): 5. 
 58 
was necessary to share the burden of North Korean aid and to upgrade the talks as 
Northeast-Asian, multilateral security cooperation. Finally, China convened the first 
round of Six-Party talks in Beijing on August 27, 2003 with the U.S., Russia, Japan, and 
the two Koreas.  
2. The Progress and the Results of the Six-Party Talks 
A total of six rounds of Six-Party Talks were held in Beijing from 2003 to 2007. 
The first round of talks was held from 27 to 29 August 2003. It was meaningful that six 
countries started negation through multilateral dialogues to come up with a peaceful 
solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. China, as the chairman of the six-party talks, 
put much effort into preventing the talks’ ending in catastrophe. During the talks, 
however, the U.S. insisted that the North Korean nuclear program be dismantled first, 
whereas North Korea insisted that both nuclear dismantling and an aid project for North 
Korea should proceed at the same time.161 In the end, the talks failed to come up with a 
substantial agreement between parties and only announced a chairman’s summary, which 
emphasized the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of the 
nuclear issue, and the normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea.162 
The second round of talks was held from 25 to 28 in February 2004. The talks 
discussed North Korean nuclear disarmament, North Korea’s security guarantees, 
compensation for the nuclear freeze, regularization of the meeting, and the configuration 
of the working group.163 After the discussion, the chairman’s statement announced that 
the parties expressed their willingness to accede to “a nuclear-weapon-free Korean 
Peninsula, and to resolving the nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue in a spirit of 
mutual respect and consultations on an equal basis, so as to maintain peace and stability 
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on the Korean Peninsula and the region at large.”164 The parties agreed to hold the third 
round of talks during the second quarter of 2004. The talks also failed to yield a 
substantial solution to the problem. However, it was the first Six-Party Talks that came 
up with a written consensus among related nations since the start of the second North 
Korean nuclear crisis. It was a meaningful in suggesting the principle of the solution and 
the future direction for the talks’ progress. 
The third round of talks was held from 23 to 26 June 2004. Compared to the 
previous six-party talks, which only agreed on the norm of a peaceful solution, the third 
round of six-party talks started to negotiate the practical framework of the solution. A 
chairman’s statement was announced with eight articles, including: reconfirming the 
commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, stressing specification of the scope 
and time, and the interval between steps of verification and the method of verification.165 
The parties stressed the need for a step-by-step process of “words for words” and “action 
for action” in search for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.166  
At the fourth round of talks, the parties finally agreed how to dismantle the North 
Korean nuclear program. The first phase of the fourth round of talks was held from 26 
July to 7 August 2005. The U.S. and North Korea had frequent bilateral contacts during 
the talks, but the first phase of talks failed to agree on the range of nuclear disarmament 
and the right to a peaceful nuclear program. The second phase of talks was held from 13 
to 19 September 2005. After coordinating about core issues among parties, the 
participating countries unanimously adopted a joint statement on 19 September. The 
parties agreed to provide light-water reactors and a treaty of nonaggression to North 
Korea while North Korea dismantled its nuclear program and returned to NPT. The 
September 19 joint statement had the big meaning that the U.S. mapped out the Northeast 
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Asian order to include peaceful coexistence with North Korea.167 It inherited the solution 
of the 1994 Agreed Framework and provided the basis of a multilateral cooperative-
security regime building in Northeast Asia.  
The fifth round of talks began in Beijing in November 2005. Despite the 
successful result of the fourth round of talks, the September joint statement confronted a 
crisis when the U.S. froze the funds of a North Korean account in Banco Delta Asia.168 
Disagreement between Washington and Pyongyang on this issue continues to block 
progress of the talks. North Korea judged that the U.S. is still hostile, so it pressured the 
U.S. with a brinksmanship strategy. North Korea test fired seven ballistic missiles in July 
2006 and conducted an underground nuclear test in October 2006.  
Eventually, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula issue was faced with the 
worst crisis since 1994. Changes in U.S. domestic politics had become a major factor to 
progress in the talks. The Bush administration faced criticism that they failed to resolve 
the nuclear issue and only increased the crisis during the six years of the president’s term.  
Additionally, since the Republicans suffered major losses in the November 2006 
midterm elections, hawks that affected the decisions of the Bush administration’s North 
Korean policy weakened sharply.169 As a result, the Bush administration changed its 
policy toward North Korea as a negotiation and resumed the third phase of the fifth round 
of talks on February 2007. The Six-Party Talks came up with a joint document on the 
first step toward the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Under the February joint 
document, North Korea will “shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, 
including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all 
necessary monitoring and verifications.”170 The parties also agreed to “the provision of 
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emergency energy assistance to the North Korea in the initial phase, assistance equivalent 
to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel, and establishment of five working groups.”171 
During the first phase of the sixth round of talks in March and July 2007, the 
members reaffirmed the implementation of the September 19th joint agreement and 
February 13th joint document. In September 2007, the members met to discuss how to 
proceed with the second phase of the February 13th agreement, and the participants 
issued a joint statement on October 3rd. According to this statement, North Korea agreed 
that it would provide “complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs—
including clarification regarding the uranium issue, and disable its Yongbyon nuclear 
facilities.”172 In return, the U.S. agreed that it would begin “removing North Korea from 
its list of state sponsors of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the 
application of the Trading with the Enemy Act toward North Korea.”173 However, the 
U.S. and North Korea again disagreed on how to verify North Korea’s nuclear activities. 
While Pyongyang refused to verify through scientific sampling, “the United States 
attempted to tie energy assistance to an agreement on verification.”174 In the end, despite 
five years of effort, the Six-Party Talks failed to achieve its goal—the denuclearization of 
North Korea.  
Although the Six-Party Talks sometimes succeeded in drawing up a joint 
statement, they had problems such as the lack of a surveillance manner and a compulsory 
method. It was also hard to reach an agreement since the Six-Party talks needed to meet 
the interests of six participants. Against the Bush administration’s hardline attitude, North 
Korea countered with brinksmanship tactics. During the Six-Party talks, China’s 
influence toward North Korea was not strong enough to persuade the country abandon 
nuclear weapons. However, China could get a positive response from the international 
community about China’s efforts in the talks.  
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3. Multilateral Cooperation and the Six-Party Talks 
China has emphasized the principle of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
and has sought to achieve this goal through the Six-Party Talks. 175  China’s active 
participation in the Six-Party Talks reflects Chinas’ attitude toward multilateral security 
cooperation. During the second round of Six-Party Talks, China offered a configuration 
for a working group to regularize the talks. Although the Chinese government did not 
mention it publicly, the researchers from China’s core national-research institutions 
argued that the Six-Party Talks should be the starting point of a Northeast Asian 
multilateral security institution.176 In May 2004, Ji Zhiye, executive vice president of the 
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), insisted that the Six-
Party Talks should be developed into a regional multilateral cooperation that can 
guarantee security and promote development in the Northeast Asian region. Shen Jiru, a 
senior fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS), also has insisted that government-affiliated research institutes 
have embarked on review of Northeast Asian security cooperation organizations. These 
claims showed that China considered institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks as a regional 
multilateral security organization.  
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through Six-Party Talks coincides with 
China’s strategy in regional multilateral security institutions. China can expand its 
influence in the region and improve its peaceful-rise image by resolving the North 
Korean nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks. In order to promote cooperation with 
the countries that are concerned to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, China has 
expressed its willingness to convene an international conference in Beijing. China also 
displayed active shuttle diplomacy among the member states. China passed on North 
Korea’s position to the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, and then transferred their responses 
to North Korea. Through these efforts, China manifested its position that it wants peace 
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in the peninsula and opposes North Korean nuclear weapon development. It contributed 
to demonstrating China as a responsible superpower and peaceful riser.  
Another beneficial aspect of the Six-Party Talks for China’s interests is that China 
can use them to check U.S. influence in the region. Unlike the U.S., which sought the 
collapse of the North Korean regime, China tried to persuade the members that the North 
Korean regime should be maintained. The geopolitical importance of North Korea has led 
China to maintain its basic position toward the North Korean regime. When considering 
sudden events such as the North Korean refugee influx and security on its Northeastern 
border, China understands that maintaining North Korea’s regime is beneficial for 
China’s national interest. China succeeded in asserting this to the other Six-Party Talks 
member states.  
On contrast, the U.S. had to adjust its own interests in the Six-party Talks, and 
also was under diplomatic pressure by China, Japan, Russia, and two Koreas. The fourth 
round of Six-Party Talks, which yield the September agreement, was the example. When 
the U.S. opposed provide light-water reactors to North Korea, China pressured the U.S. 
with its diplomatic power by persuading Japan, Russia, and two Koreas. As a result, the 
U.S. was under the burden of being responsible for the breakdown of the talks and had to 
accept a compromise that they would provide light-water reactors to North Korea in a 
timely manner. Within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. was persuaded and 
pressured by the five other countries.177  
In sum, China’s position toward regional multilateral institutions was projected 
through the Six-Party Talks, and China could achieve some benefit through the Talks. 
China’s active role in the Six-Party Talks represents that China is moving toward 
multilateral community. During the Six-Party Talks, China made efforts to solve the 
problem through peaceful negotiation. China increased its shuttle diplomacy when 
disagreement occurred, and these efforts got positive responses from the international 
community. While promoting its responsible-power image through the international 
community, China could also check U.S. influence in the Northeast Asian region. Overall, 
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China’s image during the Six-Party Talks was as the active participant among the 
multilateral institutions, and this was beneficial for China’s national interest.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
North Korean nuclear weapons are a dangerous factor that can threaten the 
security of Northeast Asia. Among the countries in this region, China has maintained 
close relations with North Korea—although there are some limitations in China’s 
influence. Thus, China’s role is important in the North Korean nuclear issue. China has 
maintained its principles—denuclearization of the peninsula and peaceful solutions 
through dialogue and negation—but has changed its attitude, from passive bystander to 
active participant, toward the nuclear issue. Although the ideological bond between 
China and North Korea has weakened over time, China still understands the strategic 
importance of North Korea. Thus, the relationship between the two countries has not 
changed a lot. In this regard, one must understand China’s general foreign-policy change 
to understand China’s attitude change in the North Korean nuclear issue.  
The main change in China’s foreign policy between 1990 and 2000 consisted of 
China’s engagement in international affairs and regional multilateral institutions. Since 
1978, China has adopted a reformed and open policy and has increased its engagement 
with Western countries. However, the country maintained a passive attitude in 
international affairs during the 1990s. The U.S. was the sole superpower after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and had posed an antagonistic attitude toward China since 
the Tiananmen incident. While dealing with sanctions from the West, China tried to 
avoid conflicts with Western powers and showed a passive attitude in international affairs. 
China was not willing to confront or to actively cooperate with the U.S. in international 
affairs. The country also worried that engagement in regional multilateral institutions 
would infringe upon China’s national interest.  
During the 2000s, China’s attitude toward international affairs changed. China 
started to resume its diplomatic relationship with the Western show confidence in its 
comprehensive national power. With its successful economic development, China’s 
leaders had confidence in its national power. The country increased its engagement in 
international affairs.  
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China’s fourth-generation leaders, who succeeded to power in early 2000s, also 
maintained this tendency. They showed their confidence in China’s national power and 
tried to act as a responsible superpower. China emphasized its peaceful rise and increased 
its active involvement in international affairs. China has good connection to the other five 
parties in the six-party talks, and international society urges China to take a leading role. 
While China maintains its economic development and growing comprehensive national 
power, China’s fifth-generation leader Xi Jinping, who was elected leader of the 
Communist Party of China, will continue this foreign policy.   
China’s foreign-policy change toward the international community has been 
expressed its active engagement in regional multilateral security institutions. 
Traditionally, China had suspected that international institutions were under the influence 
of U.S.-led Western countries. Thus, China hesitated to take part in multilateral security 
cooperation and focused on bilateral relations with other countries. However, China’s 
growing national power and interdependency with the international community led the 
country to change its position on multilateralism. China has realized that participating in 
regional multilateral security institutions such as the ARF and SCO is beneficial to 
China’s national interest. By participate those institutions, China can increase its 
influence in the Asian region, promote its peaceful-development image, and check U.S. 
hegemony in the region.  
China considers that the denuclearization and stability in the Korean peninsula is 
important to its national interests. Thus, unlike the early 1990s, China played a leading 
role in the talks and cooperated with other member nations. The Six-Party Talks still have 
many limitations in their function as a regional multilateral security institution. The 
mistrust between the U.S. and North Korea is too big to overcome, and China’s influence 
toward the U.S. and North Korea is limited. Additionally, each participant has his own 
interest, which can hinder the progress of the talks. For these reasons, the Six-Party Talks 
have failed to prevent North Korea’s nuclear weapon possession. However, China has 
shown its position in the North Korean nuclear issue through the talks. Since China is the 
most influential country over North Korea, the international community was positive 
about China’s efforts. Although the Six-Party Talks themselves are not a formal 
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multilateral security institution, China considered institutionalizing a regional multilateral 
security organization based on the frame of the talks.178 It showed China’s confidence of 
power as the leader of the regional multilateral institution.  
Finally, China’s general foreign-policy change affected its attitude change toward 
the North Korean nuclear issue. Since the mid-1990s, China had increased its 
involvement in international affairs and multilateral institutions, an encouraging 
phenomenon. Although China has conflicted with the U.S. and neighboring countries on 
many issues, the country cooperated fully with the international community and the U.S. 
to come up with a peaceful solution in the North Korean nuclear issue.  
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